论文题目:
论文语种:英文
您的研究方向:人力资源管理
是否有数据处理要求:否
您的国家:英国
您的学校背景:
要求字数:800
论文用途:硕士课程论文
是否需要盲审(博士或硕士生有这个需要):否
补充要求和说明:详细见附件
Case 1
In order to solve the problem of inefficient operations, a reform of public hospitals had been arisen all over the world. China had also participated in the trend of public health institution reform. With the reform, performance-related-pay system was widespread implemented.
This case aims at observing the changes of revenue, cost recovery, productivity which were resulted by the PRP system and whether the "bonus" system was the cause of unnecessary treatments and drugs. The case analyzes the data collecting from six hospitals and 2303 patients from 1978 to 1997.
The first hypothesis in the case is that the effect of the bonus system on hospital revenue, cost recovery, and the productivity is dependent on the different economic stimulus intensity of different systems and the reflection of the individual doctor. The case also presumes that doctors who take the necessary care will gain income as the form of the utility harvest. At the same time, they have to pay more efforts as the form of the loss. However, unnecessary care will undertake moral risk besides gain income and pay more efforts. Leisure desire and morals may limit the unnecessary care behavior of doctors.
There were three different PRP systems, be termed flat bonus, quantity-related bonus and revenue-related bonus, had been adopted. The case assumes that flat bonus will encourage doctors to provide the necessary care, but are unlikely to stimulate the doctor provides unnecessary care.If there is sufficient demand, the necessary care provided by doctors is beneficial to the patient, the hospital and the doctor. Accordingly, the income, cost recovery, productivity of the public hospital will be improved. But the doctor will not take action when the demand is insufficient with flat bonus. The quantity-related bonus will also encourage doctors to provide the necessary care, and will also encourage doctors provide more care when demand is not sufficient. Finally, the revenue-related bonus strongly stimulates doctors to provide unnecessary services and drugs in order to increase their income.
In order to verify the assumption, the case collected abundant data to observe what kinds of bonus systems had been adopted by the hospitals, what kinds of changes happened in average activity levels and productivity in the panel hospitals, and what kinds of changes happened in revenue, cost recovery, productivity and unnecessary care with changes in bonus system.
All the panel hospitals had shifted their compensation system with no bonus to flat bonus to revenue-related bonus. With the change of system, revenue rose obviously, and cost recovery increased as well. Although the productivity remained downward because of the vast input relative to lesser output, the productivity dropped more slowly than before. But the average expense of the patient increased markedly, and much of this was unnecessary.
In general, to the hospital, PRP systems, called revenue-related bonus, have a positive impact on the revenue, cost recovery, and productivity. Meanwhile, to the patients, unnecessary care and expensive drugs became a burden.
Case 2
In this paper, 350 companies were used as a sample to present a research about how participants in the process of remuneration-setting evaluate performance-related pay scheme.The aim of the research is to examine the different reasons given for using performance-related pay, and try to address “Why do companies use performance-related pay?” This research is conducted on the basic of existing theories which were introduced at the beginning of the paper: agency theories, motivation theories, and institutional and legitimacy theories.
The research findings illustratethe following three main reasons for theimplement of performance- related pay schemes: current market practice, companies’ need for legitimacy, and to attract and retain good executives, which are portrayed in detail as follow.
First of all, the schemes can be used to set performance measures and targets so that to communicate the company’s strategy, and can be intended to influence directors’ behaviors towards carrying out that strategy.
Then, the reward itself exceptproviding a monetary award for the director, it can also increase directors’ self-esteem, provideconfidencewhen he compares himself with his peers, and improve the executive’s track record, increase his negotiation ability as a kind of human capital for future pay.
In addition, since the PRP schemes can make it clear that what is important in the board’s view, and what is important in the CEO’s view, so that the CEO and the rest of the company can understand and focus to their work and make efforts.
Furthermore, companies implement performance- related pay also for the need of fairness. This is extended in two aspects: the inner fairnessin a same company between employees, and the external fairnessbetween the directors indiffidentcompanies.
Though there are many reasons to support the using of performance-related pay, there still exist some problems with it.
It is areal challenge that relating a longer term performance-related pay is difficult, since when the award period ends,the conditions may be different with those when the performance measures and targets were set.And selecting appropriate performance measures and targets can be also very difficult; and it is hard to incentive the ability of PRP; and the achievement or otherwise of results and payouts can beinfluencedby luck, particularly when based on equity schemes.
论文题目:
论文语种:英文
您的研究方向:人力资源管理
是否有数据处理要求:否
您的国家:英国
您的学校背景:
要求字数:800
论文用途:硕士课程论文
是否需要盲审(博士或硕士生有这个需要):否
补充要求和说明:详细见附件
案例1
为了解决这个问题,低效运作,公立医院改革试点已在世界各地出现。中国还参加了在公共医疗机构改革的趋势。与性能相关的薪酬制度的改革,是广泛实施。
在此情况下,旨在观察收入,收回成本,生产力的变化而导致由PRP系统和“奖金”系统是否是不必要的治疗手段和药物的原因。案件分析的数据收集从1978年至1997年的6个医院和2303患者。
第一个假设的情况下,医院的收入,收回成本,生产力是奖金制度的效果依赖于不同的经济刺激强度不同的系统和反映个别医生。还假定的情况下采取必要的照顾,医生们将获得收入形式的效用收获。与此同时,他们必须付出更多的努力,作为形式的损失。然而,将承担不必要的护理道德风险除了增益收入和付出更多的努力。休闲欲望和道德,可能会限制不必要的保健医生行为。
有三个不同的PRP系统,被称为平的奖金,奖金和收入相关的奖金数量相关,已被采纳。案例假定平奖金将鼓励医生提供必要的照顾,但不太可能刺激医生所能提供的不必要care.If有足够的需求,由医生提供必要的照顾是有利于病人,医院和医生。因此,公立医院的收入,成本回收,生产力将得到改善。但医生不会采取行动时,需求不足平奖金。数量相关的奖金也将鼓励医生提供必要的照顾,也将鼓励医生提供更多的照顾时,需求是不够的。最后,收入相关的奖金,强烈刺激的医生提供不必要的医疗服务和药品,以增加他们的收入。
为了验证假设的情况下收集了大量的数据,以观察各种奖金制度已经通过医院,什么样的面板医院平均活动水平和生产力的变化,以及什么样的变化发生在收入收回成本,生产力和不必要的治疗与奖金制度的变化。
所有面板医院赔偿制度转移平坦的红利收入相关的奖金,没有奖金。随着系统的变化,收入同比增长明显,和回收成本增加,以及。虽然生产力依然向下,因为相对较小的输出广阔的输入,生产率下降速度比以前更慢。但是,病人的平均费用显着增加,这是不必要的。
在一般情况下,到医院检查,PRP系统,称为收入相关的奖金,收入,成本回收和生产力产生积极的影响。同时,患者不必要的治疗和昂贵的药物成为一种负担。
案例2
在本文中,350家公司作为样本,提出一个研究在薪酬制定的过程中,参与者如何评估绩效工资scheme.The的研究目的是检查不同的理由使用绩效工资,并试图解决“为什么公司使用绩效工资吗?”这项研究是进行纸:代理理论,激励理论,体制和合法性理论开始被引入的现有理论的基本。
我们研究结果illustratethe三个主要原因绩效工资计划theimplement:目前的市场惯例,公司的合法性需要,并吸引和留住优秀的管理人员,这是详细描绘如下。
首先,该计划可以用来设置性能的措施和目标,使公司的战略沟通,并试图影响董事的行为,对开展这一战略。
然后,在奖励本身exceptproviding一个货币导演奖,这也可以增加董事的自尊,provideconfidencewhen他比较自己与他的同龄人,和提高执行的跟踪记录,提高他的谈判能力作为一种人力资本的未来支付。
此外,因为PRP计划可以做出它清楚,什么是重要的董事会认为,和什么是重要的首席执行官认为,使首席执行官和其他公司可以理解和专注自己的工作和努力。
此外,公司实施绩效相关,也为支付公平的需要。这是在两个方面:内同一个公司的员工之间fairnessin,外部董事fairnessbetween indiffidentcompanies的延长。
虽然有许多理由支持绩效工资的使用,也还存在着一些问题。
面的挑战,涉及较长远的绩效工资是困难的,因为奖期结束时,条件可能会有所不同性能的措施和目标时,选择适当的性能的措施和目标set.And也可以很困难;是难以激励能力PRP;和实现与否的结果和支出beinfluencedby运气,尤其是在基于股权计划。