代写assignment范文：补贴的经济学含义解读

  澳洲作业assignment：补贴的经济学解读
  “补贴”这个术语经常被运用于经济背景下。但是其背后的概念却不能被合适地给所有实践行为下定义。这个术语更多被运用在政府间的资金转移上，使它相当于实质上是一个私营部门。或者它可能指代一个产品或者服务的所提供的价格低于一个私营企业的价格，因此不得不为此付出补贴。另外，它也代表了可能会大量影响私营企业的竞争地位的各种政府政策，以采购政策的形式或者为了教育工人所设的项目。相对于上述描述“补贴”有实际意义的术语，对此的歧视将继续占据上风。
  政府征收各种税目以及颁布支出政策，它们强行把成本和其所赋予的利益加在属于私营企业的实体部分上。对于经济学家来说，或许确定补助的自然现象是一个假象的市场均衡，它是没有政府活动的。经典的经济模型的总体竞争均衡，比如，是完全分散的且体验了无政府部门。[2]政府通过税收和支出政策，改变了平衡的价格和产量。
  The term subsidy is often used in the economic context, but the concept behind it fails to have been defined appropriately for all practical purposes. The term is most often used synonymously with governmental transfer of money to an entity in the private sector, or it may refer to the provision of a good or service at a price below what a private entity would otherwise have had to pay for it. Moreover, it may also refer to various government policies that may favorably affect the competitive position of private entities, in the form of procurement policies or programs to educate workers. Ambiguity continues to prevail with respect to the aforementioned measures as ‘subsidies’ in the meaningful sense of the term. [1]   Governments engage in a wide range of tax and expenditure policies that impose costs and confer benefits on entities belonging to the private sector. To an economist, perhaps a natural phenomenon for identifying subsidization is a hypothetical market equilibrium without governmental activity. The classic economic models of general competitive equilibrium, for example, are entirely decentralized and embody no government sector. [2] The government makes an entry by way of taxation and expenditure policies, this alters equilibrium prices and output. Activities for which the net returns are reduced are discouraged to some degree, and those activities are then subject to be ‘taxed.’ Activities for which the net returns are enhanced will be encouraged to a degree, and they may be said to be ‘subsidized.’   The difficulty with this concept of subsidization is that it is exceedingly difficult to apply as a practical matter. The hypothetical market equilibrium without government cannot be observed, and indeed is not clear that the concept is coherent. Implicit in the classic general equilibrium models is a capacity for actors to engage in transactions, yet it is difficult to see how such a capacity can arise in a large economy without a government to create property rights. Further, the deviations from any benchmark equilibrium that result from government activity are exceedingly complex. Governments engage in a wide variety of taxation practice, not only are the number of tax instruments large in number, but the incidence of the various taxes is often quite uncertain. Governments also engage in innumerable regulatory programs that impose costs on private entities of various sorts; in the form of occupational health and safety programs, environmental quality programs, programs to transfer resources to certain disadvantaged groups, and untold others. Finally, government expenditure programs provide vast benefits to private sector entities in direct and indirect ways, including public education, highways, research and development funding, low cost insurance, fire and security services, a legal system, and on and on.   Against this backdrop, it is surely impossible in practice to ascertain the precise impact of governmental activity on any entity according to the sort of benchmark put forth above. The simplest alternative is to look at each government program in isolation, and to ignore the question of whether any benefits conferred may be offset by costs in another form. If a particular program confers benefits on a private entity, a subsidy is declared to exist without further inquiry.   Further it is plausible to assume that generally applicable tax, expenditure and regulatory policies affect most enterprises almost in equal standards and thus do not confer any form of subsidy. Programs of narrow applicability that target benefits at particular industries, by contrast, might be assumed to confer benefits that encourage production in that industry. To illustrate, a government might make an investment tax credit available to all industries that use durable goods, on the premise that all industries benefit about equally and that any affects on international competitiveness wash out through exchange rates, such a program might be ignored for purposes of identifying subsidies. By contrast, if the automobile industry is the beneficiary of a special tax credit program for investment in automobile manufacturing, a subsidy might be found as to that industry.   Yet another alternative is to focus on the impact of government on private activities relative to the impact of other governments on similarly situated entities elsewhere. In the international context, one might look for programs that seem to confer particularly large benefits on particular entities relative to the benefits that governments confer on similar entities in other countries. The presumption would be that most governments tax and regulate in somewhat similar fashion, resulting in similar effects on the competitive position of most private entities - only when a program for a particular group of private entities stands out as especially generous relative to such other programs would a subsidy be present. Thus, for example, if most governments provide a certain range of benefits to their farmers, those programs might be presumed to have a cancelation affect in international trade more or less, and no subsidy would be found.   Each of these alternatives have obvious deficiencies. The first has the virtue of simplicity, but its essential failing has been noted above - by ignoring the offsetting costs imposed by government on private actors it raises a great danger that subsidization will be found where a private entity has not been meaningfully advantaged by government programs. Indeed, because so many government programs are funded out of general revenues, a narrow focus on particular government expenditure programs without any offset for various forms of taxation would lead to the conclusion that there is rampant subsidization.   The second alternative deals with the insuperable complexities of calculating the net impact of national governments on domestic industries which are avoided by assuming that generally applicable programs have a neutral impact while targeted programs do not. But there is no reason to believe that this assumption is correct. Many broadly applicable programs have widely disparate effects on different industries.   The third alternative brings out another dimension, and treats subsidization as an alteration in the competitive position of private entities relative to similar entities elsewhere. This shift in emphasis perhaps captures the notion that subsidization involves ‘tilting the playing field’, and might be defended on that basis. This assumption has inherent practical problems - the presumption that most governments tax and regulate similarly with respect to background factors that affect the competitive position of private entities is highly suspect, and the mere fact that a particular type of program exists in one country and not another, or is more generous in one country than in another, is at best a weak marker for a program that shifts the competitive balance overall.   In sum, it is far easier to conceptualize a subsidy in simple economic models that it is to identify a subsidy in practice. Any administrative rule for determining whether a particular government program is in relation to subsidy or not will result in serious errors of over-inclusion and under-inclusion.   The OECD, which estimates agricultural subsidies, uses a broad definition that includes any government policy that distorts the market such that prices do not reflect marginal costs. So a tariff on imports, which taxes consumers by raising the price of imported agricultural products to benefit producers, is a subsidy, just like a direct payment to a farmer. That however is not the common understanding of a subsidy. Their definition is narrower, referring only to government payments that allow prices to remain below marginal costs. Some are direct, such as payments to farmers; others are indirect, such as government support for irrigation infrastructure, which allows producers to exclude that cost from their prices. The OECD’s Producer Support Estimate (herein after ‘PSE’) is the most widely used estimate of the agricultural subsidies provided to the farmers on the developed countries.   The PSE has been challenged by the developed nations on the grounds that the two-thirds of the estimate is comprised of not the direct support provided to the farmers but rather what is referred to as the non-subsidy support. This component of the PSE includes the market price support which is essentially the tariffs, price support and quotas. Despite the fact that none of these are subsidies per se yet he OECD figure tries to calculate the dollar estimate of this figure and incorporate it in the PSE. [3]